The EU’s Digital Services Act can impose fines of up to 6% of global annual turnover and, in extreme cases, seek a temporary service suspension. Global frameworks such as the OECD AI Principles remain non-binding, leaving states to decide whether cross-border technology risks require common enforcement or flexible national approaches.
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Technology supply chains ignore national borders, but victims and regulators are stuck inside them. The OECD AI Principles are explicitly non-binding, so adherence can become branding. A treaty with minimum standards would stop companies shopping for the weakest jurisdiction while still allowing countries to adopt stronger protections.
Voluntary principles work best for actors already inclined to behave. The DSA can impose fines up to 6% of global turnover and daily penalties for continued noncompliance. That gives a rule weight across borders. Start with narrow duties such as incident reporting, researcher access, and child-safety risk assessments, then let independent courts review enforcement.
There is no neutral global regulator waiting to take the job. Governments disagree on speech, privacy, surveillance, and due process. An enforceable body could give authoritarian states leverage over tools used elsewhere. The UN AI proposals focus on science, standards, capacity, and coordination for a reason: consensus is more realistic there than on binding sanctions.
The DSA shows enforcement is possible within a political and legal union, not across the whole world. Its 6% fine and suspension powers rest on EU courts and institutions. International rules should stay interoperable and voluntary while national regulators enforce their own laws, then cooperate on evidence and cross-border cases.